



Woman's Employment and Intra-household Bargaining Power

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Abstract: While there are various different optimistic communal implications of working status of women, this study tries to analyse the effect of employment that may change relative decision making power of women within household. Using data set of NFHS-4 (2015-16), this paper documents a positive significant increase in women's relative power to take decisions alone within household. Similarly, women are more likely to take various individual decisions either alone or jointly with husband when they are engaged in labour market. These results are consistent with a theoretical model of bargaining power in which likelihood of a woman to take part in household decision making increases upon entering the labour force. The likelihood of men to be a sole decision maker in the household falls when women are involved in labor market.

Keywords: Bargaining power, employment, decision-maker.

Introduction

More opportunities to labour market are statistically believed to improve the social and living standards of women (Heath, 2013). Encouraging women's access to labour and economic opportunities is one of the top five policy priorities in the World Development Report in the direction of gender equality (World Bank, 2012). The economic concept of gender inequality has direct link with bargaining power which is the negotiating power between members of a household to make a decision regarding family wellbeing (Seebens, 2010; Chuta, 2017). The decision making process includes the different preferences of each member of the household that might not follow unitary model (Majlesi, 2015). In a non-unitary model decisions are made through bargaining process where all members of a household use their resources to achieve desired outcomes (Chuta, 2017). However, social and economic constraints limit woman's bargaining power which restricts her decision making power within the household (Dito, 2011; Chuta, 2017).

Policymakers are concerned regarding the bargaining power of women as it has direct correlation with improving outcomes of health, education, child's clothing and family wellbeing (Doss, 2011; Chuta, 2017). A wide range of factors influence bargaining power of women which help to understand household dynamics that include income, employment, ownership of assets, and education (Chuta, 2017; Doss, 2011; UNICEF 2006). An increase in a woman's monetary holdings, options for employment outside the house and receiving cash transfers such as pension schemes, increases her bargaining power and positively affects children's and family wellbeing (Hoop *et al.*, 2018). Women's employment improves their bargaining power within the household (Anderson and Eswaran, 2009; Rahman and Rao, 2004; Majlesi, 2012; Heath, 2012). Theoretical household bargaining models also show the change in domestic violence by the channel of woman's access to economic opportunities which depend on her initial level of bargaining power (Rao 1997; Eswaran and Malhotra 2011; Heath, 2012). An increase in bargaining power for a woman who already has high bargaining power can decrease domestic violence, since work opportunities increase her ability to flee a bad marriage (Heath, 2012). However, a woman could face higher risk of domestic violence after beginning work as her husband seeks to offset the increased bargaining power that her income would otherwise bring her. Despite of positive effects of women's employment, job opportunities may have negative unintended consequences for women if it impacts their husband's attitude towards increased domestic violence.

There is a direct relationship between woman's employment and her bargaining power. A woman's bargaining power can be measured with her relative decision making power within the household. Using data on who makes decisions in different categories, including woman's own health, visit to family and relatives, visit to healthcare centers, children's health, own income, husband's income, and household purchases etc., this paper examines the effects of women's participation in labour market on women's relative decision making power within the household.

Literature Review

Non-labour income such as pension schemes, cash transfers, rental incomes etc., is being used to proxy for female's bargaining power in some previous studies. Influence of being employed and having labour income on women's bargaining power have been studied by some researchers (Atkin, 2009; Antman 2014; Heath, 2014), while few studies shed light on the impact of labour market

opportunities for women on their bargaining power (Majlesi, 2015). Studies also show that mother's earnings, employment opportunities in labour market and employment status tend to improve a woman's bargaining power in the household. Antman (2014) found a positive link of women's employment to her bargaining power within the household using data from the "Mexican Family Life Survey (MFLS)" in 2002 and 2005-07 for 9551 households. Linear regression results show that economic power and decision-making power are closely linked. Thus, a spouse's employment significantly reduces the likelihood that the head of the family alone makes decisions on household purchases. The wife's employment increases her bargaining power and the likelihood of her being involved in family decisions.

Getahun & Villanger (2015) use data from a random sample of 664 households in US where women work with a control group of 182 households of non-working women who want to join the labour market. They find that women's participation in the labour market may increase the real consumption of all members of the household. The authors find that higher confidence, economic independence, feeling of satisfaction, sense of self-worth and higher decision-making power on how to spend her income helps improve household wellbeing. Women's employment helps increase household consumption, ensures better quality of food, and reduces the severity of food insecurity and poverty.

Majlesi (2015) examines the changes in demand for labour in the Mexican manufacturing market for men as well as women that affect women's bargaining power in the household. This study uses longitudinal household level data sets for 2002 and 2005 taken from "Mexican Family Life survey (MxFLS)" which covers over 8000 households. Employment data is taken from the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS). The author has constructed a measure of women's relative decision making power based on answers to twelve questions related to decisions about health services and medicines for children, food, clothing for children, spouse, and herself, major expenditures like buying refrigerator, car, or television etc, money given to parents or relatives, employment decision and use of contraceptive method, etc. The findings point out a significant positive relation and an increase in woman's chance of being employed when demand for female labour rise in the market. Further, the results show that a rise in employment opportunities as demand for female labour in Mexican manufacturing market increases helps to significantly improve women's relative decision-making power between 2002 and 2005 for women who do not work as well as women who do work.

A similar study by Deijl (2015) from Indonesia investigates the effect of women's earning capacity on her bargaining power and its effect on child's health and educational outcomes. Using two panel data for the years 2000 and 2007-2008 from two rounds of the "Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS)" for over 30000 households, this study shows a positive relation between a woman's earning and her bargaining power in the household. The results also show that a mother's financial bargaining power has a significant positive effect on children's wellbeing, particularly on the health of girl children, although the results of the girl child is not statistically significant due to large measurement errors and small sample size.

A study by Greer (2006) from U.S examines the effect of migration and employment that influence negotiating power of women in a family. This study includes primary data through interview of immigrant women from Ethiopia and Eritrea. The results show that social network is the main tool for women to get labour market information and search job opportunities that allow them to look after children while working. Newly married working women in U.S who have lived for short period of time are more likely to have control over their own income in comparison to women who are living for longer time period. Women are likely to have equal influence in household decision making with their husband. This study concludes that working women increase their apparent contribution to the household that leads to increase their negotiating power within the household and make them empower

Heath (2012) finds the relationship between women's participation in labour market used as a proxy of bargaining power and likelihood to suffer domestic violence. This study uses survey data of 1395 households from a sixty villages outside of Dhaka, Bangladesh, which are diverse in population and work characteristics. The probit model results of marginal effects show that a woman's paid work increases the likelihood to ever experience domestic violence in comparison to woman of same age who does not do paid work. The results are consistent to show lower likelihood to experience domestic violence upon entering the labour market when woman has higher bargaining power before entering labour market as these women may have higher autonomy over assets despite of higher education.

A similar study by Aizer (2010) examines the effect of relative income earning power of females on domestic violence while studying the change in demand for female labour in California. The results show that increase in relative female wages help to reduce the likelihood of experiencing domestic violence in the

U.S, where women presumably do have higher baseline bargaining power. However, another study by Hjort and Villanger (2011) find the negative outcomess of increasing women's outside options. The results show that increasing job opportunities from Ethiopian flower factories increase chances of a woman to suffer physical violence, where women most likely to have lower bargaining power within the household. In a cross sectional study of 800 married women, Rahman and Rao (2004) analyse the effect of change in wage earning of female and male on women's power within households.

Data and Methodology

This study uses dataset from the National 'Family 'Health Survey (NFHS-4, 2015-16) for India), which covers the entire nation and has object to examine the information on socioeconomic, demographic, and health indicators that check nationwide trends and patterns in India. This survey collected information from 6,01,509 'households, 6,99,686 women, and 1,12,122 men. The survey includes 640 districts where separate data for ur'ban and rura'l population has been collected (NFHS-4, IIPS , 2015-16). NFHS survey had four separate questionnaires for the household, women, men, and biomarker where women's questionnaire lists all eligible women aged 15 to 49 and collects information on their background characteristics as age, literacy, schooling, caste; reproductive history, family planning, maternal and child health; delivery care; marriage and sexual activity; fertility preference, indicators of women empowerment as who makes household decisions, mobility freedom, use of bank account, ownership of house or land etc.; and attitude towards domestic vio'elence (NFHS-4, IIPS, 2015-16).

The main explanatory variable is woman's employment status which is represented by a binary variable that takes the value 0 if she is not working and value 1 if she is currently working, has a job but was on leave for the past 7 days, or had worked in the year preceding the survey. The working status can also be measured as all year working (full time employed), seasonally/ occasionally working (part time employed), and not working at all. There is a categorical variable where many categories of occupation are present and to make more specific categories, these are transformed into clusters with a value of 0 assigned to the not working group: the other values are 1 for professional work, 2 for clerical work, 3 for sales, 4 for agriculture, 5 for services/ household jobs, 6 for manual- skilled or unskilled work, and 7 for those who do not know their occupation type. Not working group category includes student or workers who have not reported any occupation. According to literature, the type of

work matters to affects women's bargaining power. Informal work might not give much economic freedom to women that can highly increase their negotiating power within the household, whereas, females in formal work can greatly help households financially that leads to reduce food shortage and improves family wellbeing.

The woman's decision making power in the household is measured by many different variables where respondents are asked who makes the decision about husband's earning, purchase of costly items, visit to relatives or own family house, children's health and education, visit to health centre and women's own health. Each variable takes the value 1 if the woman alone takes the decision and 0 otherwise, showing woman's higher decision making power in the household. Similar procedure is followed when husband alone takes the decision and joint decision making where both spouses are involved. Apart from these dependent and independent variables, the study also includes some control variables such as age and sex of the household head, age of woman and her husband, education of spouses, residence of living, household size, number of children in the family etc.

Woman's decision making power can be measured by her aggregate relative decision making power - the no of decisions made by woman in the household minus the number of decisions made by men. Increase in the likelihood of a woman being employed can translate into relatively more decisions made by woman within the household. However, positive change in the aggregate decisions taken by woman might not show actual increase in her bargaining power as importance of every decision is different. Every decision contains different weights and women might give up power over most important one to take control over least important decisions which may increase aggregate decisions taken by women but not their real bargaining power (Majlesi, 2015). To tackle this issue, this study also analyse changes in decision taking power over individual decisions.

This study intends to use logit model to examine the relationship between work status of woman and the likelihood of her involvement in household decision making. The causal effect of work status on bargaining power may has potential endogeneity bias, households in which woman has a greater say in decision making process may also has a greater propensity of being employed due to some omitted variable bias (Antman, 2014). To tackle this issue, this study includes household fixed effects that help to control unobserved determinants as a source of endogeneity at the household level.

Results

Descriptive Results

The descriptive results of women's, men's and household characteristics are shown in table-1. The NFHS survey data for 2015-16 indicates that 23.9% women are either currently working, have a job but were on leave for past 7 days, or have worked in the past twelve months prior to survey. From the group of working women, 51.1% women tend to work all year, 43% are seasonal workers, and 5.9% women work occasionally. Findings show that 31.2% women have no education, 14.6% acquired primary education, 45% have secondary, and 9.2% are highly educated.

The findings in Table 1 shows 4.3% men do not work, 7% are employed in professional or technical work, 2.5% in clerical jobs, 10.3% in sales, 32.3% in agriculture, 9.9% in services, and 32.5% are skilled and unskilled labour. About 18.1% have no education, 14.6% have primary education, 54.2% have secondary education, and 12.8% have higher education. The household attributes show that 76.4% household samples are from rural areas and 23.6% household samples are from urban areas. The poorest quantile in the wealth index accounts for 26.5% of the households; 23.7% are considered poorer, 19.9% belong to the middle class quantile, 16.5 fall under the richer category, and 13.4% households belong to the richest wealth quantiles.

The NFHS classifies states and union territories in India under six different regions - (1) Northern Region that includes Chandigarh, Delhi, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Punjab, and Rajasthan; (2) North Eastern Region includes Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura; (3) Eastern Region includes Andaman & Nicobar Island, Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Sikkim, and West Bengal; (4) Central Region includes Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and Uttarakhand; (5) Western Region includes Dadra & Nagar Haveli, Daman & Diu, Goa, Gujarat, and Maharashtra; and (6) Southern Region includes Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Lakshadweep, Pondicherry, and Tamil Nadu. The base category of every region is "all other regions".

The results in table-2 show that 4.71% non-employed women alone and 61.15% jointly with husband take decisions about the husband's earning. Whereas, 6.27% of working women alone and 66.43% jointly with partner are making decisions about the husband's earning. In the case of women's own health, 24.53% husbands take decisions for non-working women in comparison

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Obs.</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Min.</i>	<i>Max.</i>	<i>Description</i>
Respondent currently working/ has worked in the past year/ has job but on leave from last 7 days	45231	.239	.426	0	1	Binary, 0 and 1
Respondent Works, 1 All year	10805	.511		1	3	Categorical, 1 to 3
2 Seasonal		.43				
3 Occasional		.059				
Respondent's Education	259627			0	3	Categorical, 0 to 3
0 no education		.312				
1 primary		.146				
2 secondary		.45				
3 higher		.092				
Husband's Occupation	45194			0	7	Categorical, 0 to 7
0 Not working/ No occupation		.043				
1 Professional/technical		.07				
2 Clerical		.025				
3 Sales		.103				
4 Agricultural		.323				
5 Services		.099				
6 Skilled and unskilled		.325				
7 Don't know		.012				
Husband's Education	45194			0	8	Categorical, 0 to 8
0 No education		.181				
1 Primary		.146				
2 Secondary		.542				
3 Higher		.128				
8 Don't know		.003				
Wealth Index	259627			1	5	Categorical, 1 to 5
1 poorest		.265				
2 poorer		.237				
3 middle		.199				
4 richer		.165				
5 richest		.134				
Woman's Age	259627	27.19	5.167	15	49	Continuous
Husband/Partner's Age	44591	31.76	6.52	15	95	Continuous
Number of Household Members	259627	6.51	2.87	1	41	Continuous
Gender of Household Head	259627		.3248	0	1	Binary
1 Male		.88				
0 Female		.12				
Age of Household Head	259624	44.5	15.12	15	98	Continuous

Table 2: Descriptive statistics of working women by their power to take individual decision

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Not Working Women</i>			<i>Working Women</i>		
	<i>Obs.</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Obs.</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>
Who decides how to spend husband's earning	34057			10282		
Respondent alone		.0471	.2118		.0627	.2424
Husband alone		.2892	.4534		.23	.42023
Respondent and Husband jointly		.6115	.4874		.6643	.4722
Someone else		.0318	.1754		.043	.288
Who decides on respondent's health care	34057			10519		
Respondent alone		.0822	.2747		.1092	.3118
Husband alone		.2453	.4303		.2043	.4032
Respondent and Husband jointly		.63	.4828		.6513	.4765
Someone else		.042	.286		.0351	.261
Who decides on large household purchase	34057			10519		
Respondent alone		.0533	.2247		.0706	.25622
Husband alone		.236	.4246		.2043	.4032
Respondent and Husband jointly		.636	.4811		.6573	.4746
Someone else		.0745	.38		.0677	.354
Who decides on visits to family/ relatives	34057			10519		
Respondent alone		.0572	.2323		.0729	.26
Husband alone		.2355	.4242		.2091	.4066
Respondent and Husband jointly		.6456	.4783		.6632	.4726
Someone else		.06	.337		.054	.354
Who makes decision for using contraception	13949			4701		
Respondent alone		.074	.2618		.0759	.2649
Husband alone		.09025	.2865		.0883	.2837
Respondent and Husband jointly		.834	.372		.8341	.3721
Someone else		.0016	.04057		.0017	.04122

to 20.43% for working women where husband decides on woman's health. The proportion of working women alone taking decisions regarding the household purchases is 7.06% and 65.73% take decisions jointly with husband. It stands at 5.33% for non-working women who independently take decisions about large household purchases and 63.6% take decisions jointly with husband. Similarly,

64.56% of non-employed women and 66.32% of working women take decisions with husband regarding visit to family or relatives compared to 5.72% non-working and 7.29% working women who independently make decisions. Women jointly with husband make decisions for using contraception where statistics are quite similar at 83.4% for both working and non-working women.

Estimation Results

The linear results are shown in table 3 & 4. The estimates show the change in women's relative decision making power with her employment status measured as whether she is currently working, has worked in the past twelve months prior to the survey, or currently working but on leave for seven days preceding the survey. The estimates also show the change in women's and men's aggregate decisions made in the household alone when women are working.

The results in tables-3 show that woman's employment is positively associated with her relative power. Controlling for woman's education and age, husband's age, education, and employment, some household characteristics, and fixed effects to limit omitted variable bias, table-3 indicates that employed women are making relatively 20.8% more decisions within the household at a 1% significant level. The results show that working women independently make 5.8% more decisions. Men's power to take decisions alone falls by 15% significantly within the household when women are working.

The results in table-4 present the estimates of the impact of women's employment status measured as full time working and seasonally/ occasionally working on their relative bargaining (decision) power. The results show that women's full time (all year) employment is significantly associated with a 25% point higher the relative decision making power of women alone; the same trend is seen for women's part time (seasonal/ occasional) work status where change is lesser comparatively but significant. Similarly, full time working women make 7.4% more decisions alone significantly, whereas, the increase is 4% in aggregate decisions made by women who works part time (seasonally/ occasionally).

The results of this study are consistent with findings in previous literature that woman's involvement in labour market is positively associated with her relative bargaining power as she may relatively takes more decisions within household. Including different types of employment, this study tries to analyse the variation in change due to switching employment type- full time to part

Table 3: Effect of employment on women's relative decision making power as well as aggregate decisions made by woman and man alone.

	Woman's Relative Aggregate Decision Making Power				Woman's Aggregate Decisions				Man's Aggregate Decisions			
	Coef.	Robust S.E.	p-val	Sig	Coef.	Robust S.E.	p-val	Sig	Coef.	Robust S.E.	p-val	Sig
Woman's Work Status – Currently working/ has worked in the past 12 months/ working but on leave for last 7 days. (not working is base category)	.208	.039	0	***	.058	.018	.001	***	-.15	.034	0	***
Woman's Highest Education (No education is base category)	0	.	.	.	0	.	.	.	0	.	.	.
Primary	.062	.057	.28		.002	.024	.939		-.06	.051	.237	
Secondary	.223	.05	0	***	.005	.022	.811		-.217	.044	0	***
Higher	.504	.072	0	***	.04	.033	.231		-.464	.061	0	***
Husband's Highest Education (No education is base category)	0	.	.	.	0	.	.	.	0	.	.	.
Primary	.023	.064	.718		-.024	.028	.401		-.047	.057	.41	
Secondary	-.02	.059	.734		-.05	.026	.052	*	-.03	.051	.554	
Higher	-.051	.076	.501		-.1	.034	.003	***	-.049	.066	.46	
Don't know	.47	.345	.174		.238	.257	.355		-.232	.224	.301	
Husband's Employment Type (Not working is base category)	0	.	.	.	0	.	.	.	0	.	.	.
Professional/ Technical	.135	.106	.201		-.016	.053	.766		-.151	.087	.083	*

contd. table

Clerical	.077	.125	.539	-.071	.061	.244	-.148	.104	.155
Sales	-.11	.097	.261	-.133	.044	.003	***	.083	.776
Agriculture	-.095	.092	.301	-.119	.043	.005	***	.078	.753
Services	.159	.101	.116	-.016	.048	.737	**	.084	.037
Skilled/Unskilled Labour	.076	.09	.399	-.089	.043	.039	**	.076	.03
Don't Know	.268	.222	.228	.215	.131	.101	-.052	.164	.751
Current Age of Woman	.024	.005	0	.006	.002	.009	***	.005	0
Age of Husband	-.013	.004	.003	.001	.002	.467	.014	.004	0
Age of Household Head	0	.001	.779	-.001	.001	.013	**	.001	.328
Gender of Household Head (Female is base category)
Male	-.277	.056	0	-.185	.03	0	***	.045	.039
No of Household Member	-.016	.008	.031	-.004	.003	.235	.013	.007	.061
Wealth Index (Poorest is base category)	0	.	.	0	.	.	0	.	.
Poorer	.004	.055	.949	.006	.023	.806	.002	.049	.967
Middle	.138	.059	.019	.037	.026	.154	-.101	.051	.05
Richer	.142	.064	.026	.045	.028	.105	-.097	.056	.086
Richest	.192	.07	.006	.029	.031	.354	-.164	.062	.008
Northern Region	-.025	.052	.627	-.007	.022	.737	.018	.046	.704
North Eastern Region	.195	.065	.003	.008	.029	.789	-.187	.057	.001
Eastern Region	.03	.054	.577	-.046	.022	.037	**	.049	.12
Central Region	.197	.041	0	.034	.018	.061	*	.037	0
Western Region	-.026	.07	.706	.078	.03	.008	***	.063	.099
Southern Region	-.002	.072	.98	.153	.037	0	***	.06	.01
Constant	-1.006	.167	0	.419	.075	0	***	.143	0
Number of Observations	18571			18571					

*** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$

Table 4: Effect of employment (all year and seasonally/occasionally working) on women's relative decision making power as well as aggregate decisions made by woman and man alone

	Women's Relative Aggregate Decision Making Power				Women's Aggregate Decisions				Men's Aggregate Decisions			
	Coef	Robust S.E.	p-val	Sig	Coef	Robust S.E.	p-val	Sig	Coef	Robust S.E.	p-val	Sig
Woman's Work Status (not working is base category)	0	.	.	.	0	.	.	.	0	.	.	.
All year working	.25	.049	0	***	.074	.023	.002	***	-.176	.041	0	***
Seasonal/occasionally working	.163	.052	.002	***	.04	.022	.069	*	-.122	.046	.007	***
Woman's Highest Education (No education is base category)	0	.	.	.	0	.	.	.	0	.	.	.
Primary	.062	.057	.275		.002	.024	.932		-.06	.051	.234	
Secondary	.22	.05	0	***	.004	.022	.843		-.216	.044	0	***
Higher	.497	.072	0	***	.038	.034	.262		-.46	.061	0	***
Husband's Highest Education (No education is base category)	0	.	.	.	0	.	.	.	0	.	.	.
Primary	.025	.064	.699		-.023	.028	.414		-.048	.057	.4	
Secondary	-.019	.059	.751		-.05	.026	.055	*	-.031	.051	.543	
Higher	-.05	.076	.512		-.1	.034	.004	***	-.05	.066	.453	
Don't know	.485	.345	.16		.244	.257	.343		-.241	.225	.282	
Husband's Employment Type (Not working is base category)	0	.	.	.	0	.	.	.	0	.	.	.
Professional/ Technical	.133	.105	.209		-.017	.053	.752		-.149	.087	.086	*
Clerical	.075	.125	.549		-.072	.061	.24		-.147	.104	.158	
Sales	-.111	.097	.254		-.134	.044	.003	***	-.023	.083	.785	
Agriculture	-.095	.092	.302		-.119	.043	.005	***	-.025	.077	.752	**
Services	.157	.101	.121		-.017	.048	.724		-.174	.084	.039	**
Skilled/Unskilled Labour	.075	.09	.404		-.089	.043	.038	**	-.164	.076	.03	**
Don't Know	.266	.221	.23		.215	.131	.102		-.051	.164	.756	

contd. table

Current Age of Woman	.023	.005	0	***	.006	.002	.011	**	-.018	.005	0	***
Age of Husband	-.013	.004	.004	***	.001	.002	.456		.014	.004	0	***
Age of Household Head	0	.001	.777		-.001	.001	.013	**	-.001	.001	.329	
Gender of Household Head (Female is base category)	0	.	.	.	0	.	.	.	0	.	.	.
Male	-.278	.056	0	***	-.185	.03	0	***	.093	.044	.037	**
No of Household Member	-.016	.008	.034	**	-.004	.003	.25		.012	.007	.065	*
Wealth Index (Poorest is base category)	0	.	.	.	0	.	.	.	0	.	.	.
Poorer	.002	.055	.974		.005	.023	.829		.003	.049	.95	
Middle	.135	.059	.023	**	.036	.026	.17		-.099	.052	.055	*
Richer	.137	.064	.031	**	.043	.028	.12		-.094	.056	.096	*
Richest	.187	.07	.007	***	.027	.031	.386		-.161	.062	.01	***
Northern Region	-.025	.052	.633		-.007	.022	.743		.017	.046	.709	
North Eastern Region	.191	.065	.003	***	.006	.029	.83		-.185	.057	.001	***
Eastern Region	.027	.054	.617		-.048	.022	.033	**	-.075	.049	.13	
Central Region	.197	.041	0	***	.033	.018	.063	*	-.163	.037	0	***
Western Region	-.03	.07	.67		.077	.03	.01	***	.107	.063	.092	*
Southern Region	-.005	.072	.946		.152	.037	0	***	.157	.06	.009	***
Constant	-.997	.167	0	***	.422	.075	0	***	1.419	.144	0	***
Number of Observations	18571				18571				18571			

*** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$

time, because income matters to affect bargaining power that varies with employment hours.

This study also presents the impact of employment on individual decisions where women or men independently and women jointly with husband take decisions within the household. Making household decisions either alone or jointly with husband indicates higher strength of a woman to negotiate in a family for wellbeing of all members. Table-5 presents the relationship between woman's employment and decision making power of female and male in the household. The findings show that employed women are more likely to take decision alone and jointly with husband on their own health significantly. The estimates in table-5 indicate that when women are employed, the likelihood of a female to decide on her own health care alone is high with a significant 1.379 odds ratio and its 1.266 odds ratio when woman jointly with husband decides. Men will be at high risk of losing their sole decision maker's power within household, the results show that likelihood of men to take decision on woman's healthcare is lower with a significant 0.758 odds ratio when woman starts working outside.

The results in table-6 present the association of employment with decision on large household purchases. The findings show that working women are more likely to take independent decisions on costly items purchased in a house with 1.379 odds ratio in comparison to not working women. The estimates indicate lower probability for men to take decision alone on costly household purchases when their wife is working. Findings are consistent because employed woman often helps financially to her family and contributes more in large household purchases that indicates increasing participation of working women in household decision making process.

Table-7 presents that probability of a woman to take decision alone on visits to family and friends is higher when she is working, the estimate is significant with 1.272 odds ratio. Men are less likely to take decision alone on visits to meet family and friends when women are employed. Similarly, men remain no longer sole decision maker who decide the way and purpose to spend their own earnings.

The findings in table-8 show that woman's employment status reduces the likelihood for men to decide on their own earning alone with a significant 0.705 odds ratio. The results predict high involvement of women either alone or with husband to decide how the earning of men is spent on.

Table 5: Effect of employment on relative decision making power over individual decision

Decision about woman's health	Woman alone or with husband takes decisions			Woman alone takes decisions			Man alone takes decisions		
	Odd Ratio	Robust S.E.	Sig	Odd Ratio	Robust S.E.	Sig	Odd Ratio	Robust S.E.	Sig
Woman's Work Status – Currently working/ has worked in the past 12 months/ working but on leave for last 7 days. (not working is base category)	1	.	.	1	.	.	1	.	.
Woman's Highest Education (No education is base category)	1	.	.	1	.	.	1	.	.
Primary	1.204	.057	0	1.146	.089	.079	.818	.04	***
Secondary	1.434	.06	0	1.2	.082	.007	.708	.031	***
Higher	1.977	.135	0	1.565	.155	0	.527	.039	***
Husband's Highest Education (No education is base category)	1	.	.	1	.	.	1	.	.
Primary	1.129	.058	.018	.9	.072	.187	.866	.046	***
Secondary	1.053	.047	.246	.797	.057	.002	.898	.042	**
Higher	1.097	.073	.165	.683	.069	0	.852	.06	**
Don't know	.846	.198	.473	1.038	.392	.92	.865	.23	.586
Husband's Employment Type (Not working is base category)	1	.	.	1	.	.	1	.	.
Professional/ Technical	1.05	.091	.576	.935	.117	.593	1.04	.097	.67
Clerical	1.335	.154	.012	.978	.151	.888	.757	.089	.018
Sales	1.069	.084	.398	.739	.089	.012	1.031	.085	.707
Agriculture	1.091	.078	.225	.705	.074	.001	.975	.073	.731

contd. table

Services	1.123	.089	.145	1.054	.12	.646	.928	.077	.37	
Skilled/Unskilled Labour	1.214	.086	.006	.977	.101	.821	.834	.062	.015	**
Don't Know	.921	.142	.592	1.843	.362	.002	1.002	.172	.992	
Current Age of Woman	1.028	.005	0	1.02	.006	.001	.982	.004	0	***
Age of Husband	.995	.004	.165	.997	.005	.602	1.014	.004	0	***
Age of Household Head	.996	.001	0	.998	.002	.333	.998	.001	.145	
Gender of Household Head (Female is base category)				1	.	.	1	.	.	
Male	.895	.038	.01	.532	.029	0	1.15	.052	.002	***
No of Household Member	.963	.006	0	.983	.009	.075	* 1.019	.007	.005	***
Wealth Index (Poorest is base category)	1	.	.	1	.	.	1	.	.	
Poorer	.943	.042	.183	1	.07	.994	1.02	.047	.663	
Middle	1.013	.051	.792	1.044	.079	.575	.931	.049	.171	
Richer	1.027	.058	.634	1.014	.086	.87	.912	.054	.119	
Richest	1.142	.074	.041	.986	.094	.885	.778	.054	0	***
Northern Region	1.098	.06	.086	* 1.048	.081	.549	.981	.056	.736	
North Eastern Region	2.186	.147	0	.937	.082	.454	.534	.037	0	***
Eastern Region	1.282	.071	0	.998	.081	.978	.815	.048	0	***
Central Region	1.289	.052	0	1.116	.062	.048	** .781	.033	0	***
Western Region	1.225	.083	.003	1.635	.15	0	*** .92	.065	.241	
Southern Region	.94	.058	.312	1.404	.127	0	*** 1.293	.082	0	***
Constant	1.12	.148	.39	.114	.022	0	*** .588	.08	0	***
Number of Observations	44576			44576			44576			

*** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$

Table 6: Effect of employment on relative decision making power over individual decision

Decision about household purchase	Woman alone or with husband takes decisions				Woman alone takes decisions				Man alone takes decisions			
	Odd Ratio	Robust S.E.	p-val	Sig	Odd Ratio	Robust S.E.	p-val	Sig	Odd Ratio	Robust S.E.	p-val	Sig
Woman's Work Status – Currently working/ has worked in the past 12 months/ working but on leave for last 7 days. (not working is base category)	1	.041	0	***	1.265	.076	0	***	.779	.031	0	***
Woman's Highest Education (No education is base category)	1	.	.	.	1	.	.	.	1	.	.	.
Primary	1.243	.059	0	***	1.104	.104	.291		.779	.04	0	***
Secondary	1.372	.056	0	***	.993	.086	.936		.671	.029	0	***
Higher	1.954	.134	0	***	1.128	.139	.33		.479	.037	0	***
Husband's Highest Education (No education is base category)	1	.	.	.	1	.	.	.	1	.	.	.
Primary	1.006	.052	.908		.842	.079	.066	*	.959	.052	.437	
Secondary	.961	.043	.372		.796	.069	.008	***	.985	.047	.752	
Higher	1.058	.069	.392		.774	.096	.039	**	.905	.066	.166	
Don't know	.795	.187	.328		1.208	.576	.691		.893	.24	.672	
Husband's Employment Type (Not working is base category)	1	.	.	.	1	.	.	.	1	.	.	.
Professional/ Technical	1.122	.098	.188		.929	.145	.637		1.04	.101	.685	
Clerical	1.3	.148	.021	**	.977	.176	.895		.817	.102	.104	
Sales	1.044	.083	.585		.714	.105	.022	**	1.109	.095	.227	
Agriculture	1.056	.076	.444		.681	.088	.003	***	1.003	.078	.973	
Services	1.124	.089	.14		1.104	.15	.468		.967	.084	.7	

contd. table

Skilled/Unskilled Labour	1.128	.08	.09	*	.794	.101	.071	*	.923	.072	.305	*
Don't Know	.751	.111	.053	*	1.317	.297	.223		1.336	.218	.075	*
Current Age of Woman	1.033	.005	0	***	1.039	.008	0	***	.982	.004	0	***
Age of Husband	.997	.004	.362		.994	.006	.367		1.018	.004	0	***
Age of Household Head	.993	.001	0	***	.993	.002	.001	***	.997	.001	.009	***
Gender of Household Head (Female is base category)					1	.	.		1	.	.	
Male	.881	.037	.002	***	.47	.031	0	***	1.205	.056	0	***
No of Household Member	.951	.006	0	***	.964	.012	.004	***	1.017	.007	.011	**
Wealth Index (Poorest is base category)	1	.	.		1	.	.		1	.	.	
Poorer	1.032	.045	.477		1.087	.095	.338		.908	.042	.037	**
Middle	1.127	.056	.017	**	1.297	.128	.008	***	.802	.043	0	***
Richer	1.096	.061	.096	*	1.167	.126	.151		.769	.046	0	***
Richest	1.173	.074	.012	**	.995	.119	.965		.634	.045	0	***
Northern Region	.878	.046	.013	**	.979	.102	.842		1.187	.069	.003	***
North Eastern Region	2.176	.147	0	***	2.115	.231	0	***	.594	.043	0	***
Eastern Region	1.25	.068	0	***	1.043	.104	.674		.908	.054	.107	***
Central Region	1.209	.048	0	***	.988	.064	.857		.858	.037	0	***
Western Region	1.044	.068	.51		1.748	.19	0	***	1.008	.073	.908	***
Southern Region	1.009	.061	.889		2.292	.237	0	***	1.439	.092	0	***
Constant	1.225	.161	.122		.074	.016	0	***	.455	.064	0	***
Number of Observations	44576				44576				44576			

*** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$

Table 7: Effect of employment on relative decision making power over individual decision.

Decision about visit to family and relatives	Woman alone or with husband takes decisions			Woman alone takes decisions			Man alone takes decisions		
	Odd Ratio	Robust S.E.	Sig	Odd Ratio	Robust S.E.	Sig	Odd Ratio	Robust S.E.	Sig
Woman's Work Status – Currently working/ has worked in the past 12 months/ working but on leave for last 7 days. (not working is base category)	1	.	.	1	.	.	1	.	.
Woman's Highest Education (No education is base category)	1	.	.	1	.	.	1	.	.
Primary	1.267	.061	***	1.136	.104	.164	.76	.039	***
Secondary	1.455	.061	***	1.283	.107	.003	.645	.028	***
Higher	2.175	.152	***	1.556	.183	0	.429	.033	***
Husband's Highest Education (No education is base category)	1	.	.	1	.	.	1	.	.
Primary	1.016	.053	.762	.765	.071	.004	.962	.052	.472
Secondary	.965	.043	.428	.716	.06	0	.972	.046	.553
Higher	1.029	.069	.672	.631	.075	0	.912	.066	.206
Don't know	.653	.151	.065	.992	.444	.986	1.142	.283	.592
Husband's Employment Type (Not working is base category)	1	.	.	1	.	.	1	.	.
Professional/ Technical	1.217	.107	.025	.994	.15	.968	.913	.09	.352
Clerical	1.161	.129	.179	1.002	.178	.989	.905	.107	.401
Sales	1.025	.081	.754	.772	.109	.066	1.063	.09	.475
Agriculture	1.089	.078	.231	.724	.091	.011	.968	.075	.677

contd. table

Services	1.13	.09	.124	1.064	.141	.638	.912	.079	.284	
Skilled/Unskilled Labour	1.198	.085	.011	.871	.108	.263	.866	.067	.063	*
Don't Know	.909	.136	.523	1.478	.343	.092	1.188	.193	.29	
Current Age of Woman	1.03	.005	0	1.025	.007	.001	.984	.005	.001	***
Age of Husband	.997	.004	.479	1.008	.006	.183	1.013	.004	.001	***
Age of Household Head	.995	.001	0	.998	.002	.325	.997	.001	.004	***
Gender of Household Head (Female is base category)	1	.	.	1	.	.	1	.	.	
Male	.94	.039	.137	.502	.032	0	1.122	.051	.011	**
No of Household Member	.957	.006	0	.974	.011	.025	1.016	.007	.024	**
Wealth Index (Poorest is base category)	1	.	.	1	.	.	1	.	.	
Poorer	1.018	.045	.693	1.013	.084	.872	.946	.043	.222	
Middle	1.093	.055	.077	1.043	.096	.644	.843	.045	.001	***
Richer	1.081	.06	.159	1.107	.112	.314	.83	.049	.002	***
Richest	1.191	.077	.007	1.034	.115	.764	.69	.05	0	***
Northern Region	1.074	.059	.194	.972	.087	.754	.941	.056	.31	
North Eastern Region	2.609	.177	0	1.041	.104	.69	.469	.033	0	***
Eastern Region	1.257	.069	0	.932	.086	.441	.847	.049	.004	***
Central Region	1.309	.054	0	1.131	.072	.053	.785	.034	0	***
Western Region	1.462	.099	0	1.388	.142	.001	.74	.055	0	***
Southern Region	1.167	.074	.015	1.337	.141	.006	1.141	.075	.046	**
Constant	.936	.125	.621	.061	.013	0	.683	.096	.007	***
Number of Observations	44576			44576			44576			

*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

Table 8: Effect of employment on relative decision making power over individual decision

Decision about husband's earning	Woman alone or with husband takes decisions			Woman alone takes decisions			Man alone takes decisions		
	Odd Ratio	Robust S.E.	Sig	Odd Ratio	Robust S.E.	Sig	Odd Ratio	Robust S.E.	Sig
Woman's Work Status— Currently working/ has worked in the past 12 months/ working but on leave for last 7 days. (not working is base category)	1.348	.048	0	1.31	.085	0	.705	.027	0
Woman's Highest Education (No education is base category)	1	.	.	1	.	.	1	.	.
Primary	1.204	.055	0	1.163	.109	.106	.843	.04	0
Secondary	1.406	.056	0	1.045	.093	.621	.699	.029	0
Higher	1.862	.121	0	1.096	.149	.499	.558	.038	0
Husband's Highest Education (No education is base category)	1	.	.	1	.	.	1	.	.
Primary	1.056	.053	.28	.837	.083	.073	.938	.049	.219
Secondary	1.038	.046	.4	.756	.067	.002	.9	.041	.02
Higher	1.033	.065	.604	.748	.099	.028	.89	.058	.077
Don't know	.863	.199	.522	1.492	.663	.368	.97	.241	.904
Husband's Employment Type (Not working is base category)	1	.	.	1	.	.	1	.	.
Professional/ Technical	1.193	.1	.035	1.052	.177	.763	.97	.086	.73
Clerical	1.333	.145	.008	1.255	.245	.244	.777	.088	.025
Sales	1.078	.082	.325	.741	.116	.055	1.027	.081	.736
Agriculture	1.108	.076	.136	.817	.109	.13	.958	.07	.557

contd. table

Services	1.183	.09	.027	**	1.192	.176	.235	.934	.075	.39	
Skilled/Unskilled Labour	1.2	.082	.008	***	1.031	.135	.816	.87	.063	.055	*
Don't Know	.898	.129	.455		1.709	.418	.028	1.144	.176	.381	
Current Age of Woman	1.029	.004	0	***	1.015	.007	.046	.98	.004	0	***
Age of Husband	.998	.003	.622		1.01	.005	.046	1.012	.003	0	***
Age of Household Head	.994	.001	0	***	.995	.002	.02	.999	.001	.503	
Gender of Household Head (Female is base category)	1	.	.		1	.	.	1	.	.	
Male	.91	.036	.018	**	.515	.035	0	1.128	.048	.004	***
No of Household Member	.962	.006	0	***	.983	.013	.195	1.018	.006	.005	***
Wealth Index (Poorest is base category)	1	.	.		1	.	.	1	.	.	
Poorer	.968	.041	.443		1.055	.091	.537	.982	.043	.684	
Middle	1	.047	.992		1.165	.112	.114	.948	.047	.276	
Richer	1.038	.056	.489		1.089	.118	.43	.906	.051	.078	*
Richest	1.061	.066	.335		.795	.104	.078	.826	.053	.003	***
Northern Region	.987	.051	.791		.82	.084	.053	1.094	.059	.093	*
North Eastern Region	1.616	.099	0	***	.879	.096	.238	.719	.046	0	***
Eastern Region	1.176	.062	.002	***	1.025	.096	.792	.888	.049	.031	**
Central Region	1.261	.047	0	***	1.06	.072	.392	.793	.031	0	***
Western Region	.798	.049	0	***	1.084	.13	.501	1.407	.09	0	***
Southern Region	.809	.047	0	***	1.793	.193	0	1.54	.092	0	***
Constant	.928	.115	.548		.064	.014	0	.697	.09	.005	***
Number of Observations	44339				44339			44339			

*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

Table 9: Effect of employment on relative decision making power over individual decision

Decision for using contraception	Woman alone or with husband takes decisions			Woman alone takes decisions			Man alone takes decisions					
	Odd Ratio	Robust S.E.	p-val	Sig	Odd Ratio	Robust S.E.	p-val	Sig	Odd Ratio	Robust S.E.	p-val	Sig
Woman's Work Status – Currently working/ has worked in the past 12 months/ working but on leave for last 7 days. (not working is base category)	1	.089	.14		.993	.085	.931		.883	.07	.118	
Woman's Highest Education (No education is base category)	1	.089	.14		1	.085	.931		1	.07	.118	
Primary	.989	.102	.916		.965	.12	.778		1.02	.105	.846	
Secondary	1.3	.13	.009	***	.956	.104	.68		.787	.079	.017	**
Higher	1.882	.325	0	***	.838	.136	.275		.528	.092	0	***
Husband's Highest Education (No education is base category)	1	.089	.14		1	.085	.931		1	.07	.118	
Primary	1.16	.134	.2		.904	.119	.444		.863	.1	.204	
Secondary	1.115	.115	.292		.904	.109	.399		.887	.092	.248	
Higher	1.112	.171	.489		.785	.133	.154		.88	.137	.413	
Don't know	2.488	2.533	.37		1.487	.972	.544		.407	.413	.376	
Husband's Employment Type (Not working is base category)	1	.089	.14		1	.085	.931		1	.07	.118	
Professional/ Technical	.955	.224	.843		.778	.171	.253		1.183	.282	.479	
Clerical	1.009	.284	.975		.631	.177	.102		1.105	.323	.732	
Sales	.892	.179	.571		.866	.172	.471		1.262	.261	.261	
Agriculture	.863	.156	.416		.656	.12	.021	**	1.31	.247	.152	

contd. table

Services	.893	.179	.572	.827	.168	.35	1.266	.264	.258
Skilled/Unskilled Labour	1.097	.2	.61	.633	.114	.011	1.01	.191	.956
Don't Know	.525	.177	.056	.804	.302	.561	2.183	.743	.022
Current Age of Woman	1.019	.01	.059	1.011	.011	.32	.984	.01	.107
Age of Husband	.987	.008	.085	.997	.008	.707	1.013	.008	.097
Age of Household Head	1.001	.003	.794	.998	.003	.458	.999	.003	.769
Gender of Household Head (Female is base category)									
Male	.977	.106	.831	.887	.1	.29	1.05	.117	.66
No of Household Member	.974	.015	.083	1.025	.016	.113	1.028	.015	.068
Wealth Index (Poorest is base category)	1	.	.	1	.	.	1	.	.
Poorer	1.109	.108	.288	1.047	.118	.682	.901	.088	.288
Middle	1.209	.135	.088	.914	.116	.481	.8	.089	.046
Richer	1.361	.174	.016	.923	.131	.57	.718	.093	.011
Richest	1.386	.206	.028	.849	.13	.284	.707	.106	.021
Northern Region	1.233	.154	.092	.707	.088	.005	.819	.103	.112
North Eastern Region	.706	.093	.008	.722	.107	.028	1.404	.187	.011
Eastern Region	.776	.089	.028	.757	.093	.023	1.278	.149	.036
Central Region	1.521	.126	0	.906	.084	.29	.655	.055	0
Western Region	.64	.088	.001	.683	.11	.018	1.581	.219	.001
Southern Region	.831	.129	.233	1.086	.155	.564	1.171	.182	.31
Constant	6.118	1.936	0	.152	.054	0	.133	.042	0
Number of Observations	18650	18650	18650	18650	18650	18650	18650	18650	18650

*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

Apart from decisions on household purchase, husband's earning, women's health and visit to family, decision for using contraception also matters to affect women's relative decision making power. When women make decisions for using contraception, they are considered to attain some bargaining power as they are free to decide for their own and family's wellbeing. The results in table-9 show that employed women are less likely to take decisions alone for using contraception, but they have high likelihood when decide jointly with husband, though estimates are insignificant. The one result is justified with another as the findings in table-9 present that men are less likely to be a sole decision maker for using contraception when women are working and earning money in return.

Conclusion and Discussion

Using data on a wide range of decisions within household, this study tries to gain a better understanding of the household bargaining power between partners and change in women's employment status. The findings of this study indicate that woman's employment status affects her relative bargaining power within household. While female employment increases household income that may increase her status in family and improves her decision making power. This study employs different strategies to assess the effect of employment on women's relative decision making power as well as bargaining power over individual decisions, using NFHS-4 in different regions of India. The omitted variable bias is being tacked with fixed effect and standard errors are robust that are adjusted for 6966 clusters in PSU.

The linear results show a positive and significant effect of woman's employment status on her relative decision taking power within household. Women who work take more number of decisions alone over men relatively that indicates increase in women's decision making power. The findings show a negative association of women's employment with husband's authority to make decisions alone. This analysis is robust to sensitivity analysis based on different ways- categorizing into all year (full-time) and seasonal/occasional (part-time) employment, to measure maternal employment and validates our results. Logistic results present the effect of employment on the different individual decisions made by woman or men either alone or jointly. The results show that women are more likely to take most of household decisions either as a sole decision maker or jointly with husband when they are working and financially independent. Apart from these positive results, findings indicate that women

might not be a sole person to decide for using contraception. Instead of this, women are more likely to take decision for using contraception jointly with husband. The study has few limitations. There is inadequate information on the mother's time devoted for labour work and earning information is also missing in the DHS survey data, which would have been useful.

Appendix

Table 2A: Descriptive statistics of individual decisions

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Obs.</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Min.</i>	<i>Max.</i>	<i>Description</i>
Who decides on large household purchase	44576			1	4	Categorical
Respondent alone	2559	.0574	.2326			
Husband alone	10188	.2285	.42			
Respondent and Husband jointly	28574	.641	.48			
Someone else	3255	.0726	.466			
Who decides on visits to family/ relatives	44576			1	4	Categorical
Respondent alone	2717	.061	.24			
Husband alone	10218	.23	.42			
Respondent and Husband jointly	28963	.65	.48			
Someone else	2678	.059	.32			
Who decides how to spend husband's earning	44339			1	4	Categorical
Respondent alone	2249	.0507	.22			
Husband alone	12206	.2753	.45			
Respondent and Husband jointly	27657	.6237	.4844			
Someone else	1384	.05	.309			
Who makes decision for using contraception	101730			1	4	Categorical
Respondent alone	7753	.0762	.2653			
Husband alone	9052	.0889	.2847			
Respondent and Husband jointly	84801	.8336	.3724			
Someone else	124	.0012	.0348			

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